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1. Introduction 
As part of the Brexit ‘Leave’ campaign, Michael Gove famously claimed that “people in this 
country have had enough of experts” (Mance 2016). Contrary to what one might infer from 
recent reporting over the role of expertise and Brexit, public trust in science and scientists is 
at a near all-time high (British Science Association 2014; IPSOS Mori 2017). Nevertheless, 
the political climate has been deeply impacted by ‘fake news’, with some arguing we have 
arrived in a ‘post-truth’ era in which personality and opinion trumps evidence and reason. 
This makes the need for frankness in debates about the use and boundaries of science and 
policy all the more essential. We, therefore, welcome the more reflective and nuanced 
approach to the use of the behavioural science in policy-making that we detect in this and 
other recent work by the Behavioural Insights Team (e.g. Hallsworth & Sanders 2016). In 
their account of where we are now with behavioural science and policy, Sanders, Snijders, 
and Hallsworth comment that “there is much for behavioural science to be pleased with” 
(2018, p. X). Yet despite our support for the approach taken in their paper, we suggest that 
there are fewer reasons to be pleased than currently acknowledged. Our critique tackles three 
main issues: the empirical, the normative, and the political.  
 To these ends, in section one, we examine the twin issue of what counts as 
‘behavioural’ and how this label is being used to legitimate a range of policy activities. We 
then look specifically at RCTs in section two, highlighting the extra-scientific dimensions of 
this empirical “What Works” revolution (What Works Network 2014). Following this, we 
also question some of the ontological assumptions that drive the empirical research and its 
translation into policy; in particular, we ask where the collective is to be found in behavioural 
public policy. 
 
2. Behavioural interventions, behavioural science, and legitimacy? 
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The term ‘behavioural sciences’ is often used in policy debates without due attention to what 
this is actually referring to. For a representative example, see the contributions on health 
nudges in Cohen, Lynch, and Robertson (2016), in which solutions derived from behavioural 
science are discussed – without once providing a definition of behavioural sciences. This 
matters because different academic fields have a different understanding of what 
interventions fall under its respective remit, and it becomes unclear to what the term refers, or 
how exactly it links to fields like behavioural economics or cognitive psychology (and how, 
for instance, is it separate from other fields such as evolutionary psychology). 
Currently, the use of the term ‘behavioural sciences’ fulfils an interesting justificatory 
role at the BIT and similar organisations. Proponents of behavioural policy draw on the 
scientific authority of various fields of study on behaviour to justify policy interventions 
(Lepenies & Malecka forthcoming). Yet this scientific authority itself is rather amorphous 
(Malecka & Nagatsu 2017). As a result, there is a risk of claiming more for behavioural 
science than would hitherto have been considered to count. This tendency is evident in 
Sanders, Snijders, and Hallsworth’s current contribution to debate. Their piece, we suggest, 
reveals a more general and prevalent temptation to look at everything policy-related through 
a 'behavioural' lens (see e.g. Hallsworth 2016). The consequence of such framing is that 
substantial swathes of policy end up being viewed as if they are centrally concerned with 
behaviour. While this may be true in a trivial sense - for instance, we might say all regulation 
is about behaviour in the sense that it aims to alter the behaviour of some actor(s) or other 
(Quigley 2014) – the breadth of such a framing is difficult to legitimise. 
There are two main issues here. First, the authors are overly permissive in what counts 
as a behavioural intervention, resulting in what we would like to call ‘behavioural policy 
overreach’. Second, and something which we tackle in Section 3, is a problem that arises with 
the use of randomised-controlled trials (RCTs). In essence, there is a tendency to claim an 
intervention to be a ‘behavioural’ policy tool in virtue of the fact that it has been tested via 
RCT (even traditional regulatory tools such as a taxes or mandates). Combined, these two 
aspects become self-legitimising; that is, they support policy-makers’ claims to engage in all 
types of policy interventions on behavioural grounds which are then claimed to be more 
‘scientific’.  
An example of such behavioural policy overreach can be seen where the authors 
describe governmental regulations that ban or put limits on food ingredients, like sugar or 
trans-fats (p. X). Such a regulation, governing the addition of ingredients in food, is not a 
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behavioural stimulus. It is traditional command-and-control regulation, where certain 
constraints are imposed on those regulated; in this case, manufacturers. Relatedly, the authors 
argue that, sometimes, behavioural analyses say that the best intervention is not to change 
behaviour, but to mitigate the consequences of the behaviour (p. X). Thus, such analyses 
encompassed within ‘behavioural’ policies do not seek to change people's consumption 
habits, but instead change the outcomes that accrue. But again, this ought not to be construed 
or presented as a behavioural intervention. It is not seeking to change the behaviour in 
question, but rather its corollaries. In a sugar-reduction policy, such as the one the UK is 
considering implementing in April of 2018, the goal of the policy is to have companies 
change the formulation of their products, to lower the amount of sugar people consume 
without changing their behaviour. This is simply old-fashioned regulation, with higher 
taxation as a penalty to those who do not comply (and is one which appears to work 
(Hallsworth 2016)).  
This temptation to claim standard forms of regulation or legislation as part of ‘the 
behavioural sciences’ is distorting. Such regulation can be clearly distinguished. Moreover, it 
is good and proper to do so. The European Commission’s JRC has suggested distinguishing 
between behavioural interventions by classifying them into behaviourally-informed, 
behaviourally-aligned, and behaviourally-tested initiatives (Lourenço et al., 2016). However, 
simply because a policy is discussed by a behavioural insights team does not render it 
‘behavioural’ in any of these proposed classifications. Without clear demarcations of what 
‘behavioural interventions’ can and cannot achieve, the danger is that behavioural policy is 
mistakenly identified with ‘whatever behavioural policy units do’. This harbours political risk 
for evidence-based policy in government and for the scientific evidence-base it aims or 
claims to draw upon. Even the most genuine attempt to take a more evidence-based approach 
to policy cannot apply scientific rigor to all aspects of its operations. Nudge units are also 
political actors, part of whose operations simply defy evidence-based principles. To take just 
one example, note that the process of “issue selection,” by which new behavioural 
interventions or new fields of engagement are chosen, likewise is not informed by evidence 
only. Our claim is not that nudge units always engage in such justifications of policies, but 
that care needs to be taken with the emphasis put on ‘evidence’, what counts, and whether it 
answers the questions we need it to, as we discuss below. 
Explicitly demarcating and acknowledging the limits of the behavioural sciences – 
both empirically and normatively – may reduce the scope of the application of ‘behavioural’ 
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tools to policy-making, as well as the political influence of such approaches, possibly beyond 
a point that the authors and other proponents would find desirable. Yet it might be a long-
term strategy that is in their interest. Claiming more for (behavioural) science than is due puts 
the credibility and legitimacy of behavioural approaches at risk. Conversely, there is little risk 
(beyond perhaps the purely political), and much to be gained, by saying, ‘here are the limits 
of behavioural science as it applies to policy, and beyond this it has nothing to say about how 
to form good policy.’  
 
3. A bundle of assumptions 
The justification supporting many ‘behavioural’ policy proposals is rooted in a notion that 
scientifically-grounded results are undeniably true, accurate, and authoritative. In particular, 
much justificatory weight within behavioural policy practice is placed upon RCTs. We, 
therefore, examine some issues that attend these, before turning to consider the individualistic 
focus of much of behavioural public policy. 
 
3.1 RCTs, evidence, and politics 
The BIT is firmly committed to the use of RCTs to test policy interventions. This is clear 
from the 300+ such trials that they have conducted in recent years (Sanders et al. 2018, p. X). 
Much of what we write here will not be news to practitioners (see Glennerster 2013), and we 
are here not critical of the use of RCTs per se. Our concern is that the use of RCTs in the 
behavioural policy arena is outpacing critical reflection about their uses and the distinct 
epistemic and normative presumptions of the “policy culture” in which they are drawn upon.  
Proponents and critics alike should welcome the advanced reflections on the 
methodological limits of RCTs in the work of those within the BIT (e.g. Hallsworth 2016; 
Hallsworth & Sanders 2016; Sanders et al. 2018). Nevertheless, we push for further 
contextual engagement with these here. There are issues not only about the (types of) 
answers that RCTs can provide, but also about the (types of) questions they are suited to ask 
in the first place. The type of behavioural public policy practiced by the BIT comes with an 
implicit (only sometimes explicit) theory of evidence. There is a tendency to assume that 
RCTs can establish ‘what works’. However, as a number of commentators have argued 
elsewhere, such trials are not necessarily suited to answering the ‘what works’ question when 
applied to social policy unless a long list of qualifications is added and addressed (see, e.g. 
Cartwright, 2010; Deaton 2009; Deaton & Cartwright 2017; Favereau 2016; Reiss 2007 & 
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2014). As Cartwright and Hardie have pointed out, RCTs generally establish not ‘what 
works’ but only that something worked, at some place, at that time (Cartwright & Hardie 
2012, 122–34). Cartwright (2010) goes even a step further and argues that all that RCTs can 
do in terms of policy predictions is to predict the efficacy of similar RCTs with the same 
target population. They are good at identifying causal connections between interventions on a 
target and outcomes under very specific conditions and circumstances. Only with a large host 
of additional assumptions can the external validity of RCTs be guaranteed, and the promise 
of social effectiveness be achieved. This means that their use and application in the area of 
social policy interventions can be problematic, especially where a general roll-out of policy is 
intended after limited trials. This is all known to practitioners. But beyond questions of 
effectiveness lurk other distinct issues with RCTs in social policy that can only be understood 
in a broader context (Jung et al. 2014).  
A look at more matured debates about the use of RCTs in clinical contexts is 
instructive here (Ashcroft 2004) and shows that there are difficult ‘cultures’ of how much we 
can learn from experimental evidence in different settings. Favereau, for example, notes that 
RCTs in medicine have historically included patient safety and effectiveness protocols, 
whereas in social-policy RCTs (or randomised-control experiments), only effectiveness is 
tested (2016, p. 209). Safety - social or psychological - is not included. This, of course, is not 
specific to RCTs as a method – but depends upon the disciplinary context of how they are 
understood. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the specific implications for the 
culture of policy-making of widespread RCT usage.  
Behavioural science researchers have been attentive to the ethics of experimental 
trials (Glennerster 2013), but it is the political ramifications of policy-by-RCT and their 
implications specifically within the culture of policy-making that is missing. There are issues 
with the (implicit) theories of desired political change that the widespread use of RCTs 
engenders. At the level of behavioural policy in practice, RCTs are used in the context of a 
project of ‘radical incrementalism’. As outlined by Halpern, this “is the idea that dramatic 
improvements can be achieved, and are more likely to be achieved, by systematically testing 
small variations in everything we do, rather than through dramatic leaps into the 
dark” (Halpern 2015, p. 291). Added to this, a look at the use of RCTs in development policy 
shows another policy culture in which RCTs are used. Banerjee and Duflo (2009) speak here 
of a “quiet revolution” through RCTs, as they argue that political constraints “make it 
difficult to find big solutions to big problems” (for critiques, see Berndt & Boeckler 2016 or 
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Reddy 2012). Proponents of behavioural policy may agree with these normative theories of 
political change, or they may disagree. However, it means that policy-by-RCT is neither 
ideologically neutral nor purely evidence-based; it depends on the policy culture in which it is 
utilised. Sanders and colleagues write that after the successes of a maturing BIT, it is possible 
to focus on longer terms projects, and less on politically expedient ‘quick wins.’ We welcome 
this as an opportunity for the BIT and similar units to also think critically about the policy 
culture that will mature with this. 
 
3.2 Whither the collective? 
Our penultimate concern about the description of behavioural advances in Sander, Snjiders, 
and Hallworth’s article is about the individualistic focus that behavioural policy-making 
seems to take. While we are encouraged by their consideration of upstream regulatory 
change, such as they mention in their discussion of corporate fossil fuel use (p. X), the 
authors tend to focus on individuals, even when thinking about groups. For example, in the 
section about social diffusion, they say that the behavioural sciences have not focused enough 
on understanding how to harness peer-to-peer networks in order to influence behaviour (p. 
X). We do not dispute the potential (in terms of policy/intervention effectiveness) which 
drawing on social norms and dynamics represents. We do, however, see two issues that bear 
further reflection. 
 First, future work in this area would do well to think beyond the individual. 
Frequently, in considering social groups, the focus is on how one individual may impact the 
behaviour of another individual. Even organisations are just a sum of individuals. Again, 
there is a trivial sense in which this is true; of course, groups are comprised of the individuals 
which make them up. However, groups are more than this important ways. For instance, 
Sanders et al. does not make mention of any collective notion of identity and agency (pp. X-
X). Yet, these may be key to understanding why the behaviour of groups can be different 
from the behaviour that each individual within the group would display if they were separate 
from the group (a negative example is of rioting, and a positive example is of standing up to a 
bully) (see the various discussions in Tajfel 1982). Solidarity, community, compassion, and a 
number of other values are in play with regards to group agency, but do not seem to 
ordinarily be taken account of or examined in the behavioural-policy arena. 
 Second, there has been very little critical reflection upon the permissibility of drawing 
on social dynamics, either by behavioural policy practitioners or theorists. Studies focus on 
7 
 
the effectiveness of exploiting social norms without explicit consideration of the potential 
damage to relationships within communities (e.g. Kettle et al. 2016). The difficulty with this 
is that such approaches may not discriminate between instruments that address citizens as 
reasonable agents and those that treat them merely as social beings/members of communities 
responding to cues. There is, therefore, work to be done on the legitimate (normative) limits 
of this kind of policy-making. As such, there are a number of significant, yet unanswered 
questions. These include how behavioural policy-makers conceive of the citizen in social 
relationships; how (or whether) they account for family-based decision-making, or group 
alienation from a system that is attempting to organise society; and how they account for 
behaviours that appear to be undesirable, irrational, or unwise from their perspective, but 
which are eminently desirable, rational, and wise from a different point of view without 
falling back on the ‘cognitive bias’ notion (see, for instance, work on ‘shortened horizons’ by 
Warin, et al., 2010; or that on the minority-group women who decide to have children at an 
earlier age by Geronimus 1987, 1996).  
If behavioural policy-makers claim to understand human behaviour to the point that 
they can reliably predict it, and manipulate it, then they need to include different 
conceptualisations about groups. Much of our lives are led within larger or smaller groups, 
and there is reason to doubt that we can really understand what individuals do, and why, 
without considering their social/familial group identities. This is something that could be 
aided by deeper consideration of different psychological theories regarding how individuals 
and groups act, as well as different normative theories about what values and principles ought 
to be given precedence in policy-making.  
 
4. Concluding thoughts 
As we noted at the beginning of this commentary, we welcome the more reflective and 
longer-term thinking evident in this article by Sanders and colleagues. When charting the 
development of behavioural public policy, there is as they say much to be pleased with. 
However, we end on a note of caution. The authors say that the principle of having “a 
positive social impact” (p. X), inspired by Thaler’s “nudge for good” (Thaler 2015) is at the 
core of the BIT practices today. Behavioural policy makers will, of necessity, and by 
favouring some interventions over others, take a stand on empirical, normative, and political 
normative issues. This includes giving implicit answers about what counts as ‘positive social 
impact’ and what is ‘good’. Given this, we would encourage further work and reflection on 
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the assumptions and choices in order to make them more transparent and explicit, and to 
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